THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FINAL AND EFFICIENT CAUSALITY: PETER AURIOL AND (EXAMPLES OF) HIS INFLUENCE

1. Chronology

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2. Status quaestionis

I say that the truth is that the whole nature is ordered towards God as its end, and at the same time it necessarily depends upon God as its efficient cause. But what is not certain is whether because [the whole nature] is ordered towards God as its end, for this reason it is necessarily ordered towards him as its efficient cause, so that final causality with respect to the whole nature would necessarily imply the causality of the efficient cause. (Auriol, Rep. I.3.1)
3. Hervaeus Natalis’s first argument

1. All things that are ordered towards an end could either (a) be so ordered by something other than these things, or (b) by themselves.
2. If (b) things were so ordered by themselves, then they would order themselves either (i) by the acts of their intellects, or (ii) by their very being.
3. But (¬ii) they cannot be so ordered by their very being; for to direct belongs not to being but to the intellect.
4. But (¬i) they also cannot be so ordered by the acts of their intellects, because their order towards their end precedes the acts of their intellects. In addition, not only these things that are endowed with intellects but also beings that lack intellects are ordered towards the end.
5. Hence, (¬b) things are not ordered towards an end by themselves.
6. Hence, (a) things are ordered towards an end by something other than themselves.

(paraphrase; see Auriol, Scriptum I.3.1, Rep. I.3.1; Hervaeus, Quodl. II.1)

4. Auriol against Hervaeus

When you say that all things that are ordered toward the end are directed toward the end either by themselves, or by something else, – I ask: what do you mean by ‘being directed’?

Either you understand that they receive a certain weight [pondus] by which they tend toward an end, just as heavy things [tend] toward the centre [of the Universe]. And this is incomprehensible.

Hence, I understand by ‘being directed toward the end’ nothing more than being the foundation of the order toward the end [fundare ordinem in finem]. And if you ask by what they are the foundation of this order, I respond that [they are the foundation] by their proper essence, not by production; just as my foot would be for the sake of me, and would be the foundation of the order toward me, [even] if it had not been produced. Similarly, I say that all particular perfections found the order toward the total perfection as the end.

Nor is it necessary that this order be imprinted onto them by an agent, because [this order] either is [their] nature itself, or arises from [their] nature.

The example of the arrow is irrelevant in the present context. For the arrow is directed toward the end or the target because a motion is impressed upon it that is other than its proper motion […] That is why the motion toward the target is impressed onto it, which consists in being directed toward the target. But in the case under consideration no motion is posited but only a certain order. Nor is this order impressed by another, in the manner [in which the motion is impressed] onto the arrow [directed toward] the target; rather, [its] nature has it by itself, insofar as it is such a nature. (Auriol, Rep. I.3.1)
5. Auriol’s first argument against Hervaeus

1. In order to establish if two items are (a) one and the same thing or if (b) the second item necessarily depends upon the first item, the following test can be used. If, by a possible or an impossible supposition, when the first item does not exist, the second item could remain, the second item was (a) not one and the same thing as the first item, nor (b) necessarily depends upon the first item.
2. But, by a possible or impossible supposition, even if the whole universe of beings had not been produced, it would still be ordered to the noblest subsistent being, i.e. God.
3. Proof of (2). The inclination that each thing has towards its end arises from the imperfection of each thing.
4. But each thing is imperfect by its own nature, not because of being produced.
5. Therefore (2).
6. Therefore, from the fact that the Universe is ordered towards God as its ultimate end it does not necessarily follow that it was produced. (paraphrase; see Auriol, Rep. I.3.1; Scriptum, I.3.1)

6. Auriol’s second argument against Hervaeus

1. It belongs to the nature of relation that with all other things set aside, once its foundation and terminus have been posited, the relation itself arises.
2. The order of things towards their end is a relation.
3. Therefore, the order of things towards their end will obtain with all other things set aside, once its foundation and terminus have been posited. [from 1, 2]
4. The foundation of a relation must remain in existence for as long as this relation remains in existence.
5. Production passes while the relation of being ordered towards an end remains.
6. Therefore, production cannot be the foundation of the relation of being ordered towards an end. [from 4, 6]
7. If one were to posit creatio continua, which would not cease at the moment things are produced but would rather extend over the whole duration of their existence, this would still make the natures of things, rather than their production, the first foundation of their inclination towards the end.
8. For that is the first foundation of a relation which is first denominated by this relation.
9. But the order that things have towards their end immediately denominates the natures of things.
10. For things are ordered towards their end by their proper natures. For proof, see argument one above.
11. Therefore, (7). (paraphrase; see Auriol, Rep. I.3.1; parts also in Scriptum I.3.1)
7. Auriol’s example

For if (by a possible or impossible supposition) a man had not been produced, then all his parts would not have been produced. For *being produced* does not belong to man’s essence. For even if he had not been produced, he would still have the same quidditative definition. But if a man had not been produced, the members [of his body] would still be ordered to one another. For [his] teeth would [still] be for the sake of the stomach, the stomach for the sake of the liver, and all [members] for the sake of the heart. For each member [of his body] would retain its nature, by which it is ordered to another. Therefore, the order toward end is not funded upon natures insofar as they have been produced. (Auriol, *Scriptum* I.3.1; see also *Rep.* I.3.1)

8. Auriol’s critics. Francis of Marchia’s concession to Auriol

To the other argument, when it is said ‘by what is that which is for the sake of the end ordered? Either by the end, or by the efficient [cause], or by itself”, I say that [what is for the sake of the end] is formally ordered by the order itself, is foundationally [*fundamentaliter*] ordered by itself, is finally ordered by the end, and is effectively [*efficienter*] [ordered] by nothing. Hence, if you ask by what it is ordered, if ‘by what’ [*a quo*] means an effective principle, you beg the question, because it is not effectively ordered by anything. Whereas if ‘by what’ means a formal, material, or a final principle, then [this thing] is formally ordered by the order, fundamentally by itself, and finally by the end. (Marchia, *Scriptum* I.2.2)

9. Auriol’s critics. Francis of Marchia’s objection to Auriol

1. A cause which, if (under an impossible supposition) it were newly posited, would not newly infer its effect without another cause, also does not infer its effect without another cause if it is posited from eternity.
2. (1) is clear. For just as a newly posited cause is related to a new effect, so a cause posited from eternity is related to an eternal effect.
3. But if (under an impossible supposition) the first being were newly posited in being, it would not infer in act things other than itself unless by the mediation of some efficient causality.
4. (2) is clear. For it is impossible that something proceeds from non-being to being unless that be by mediation of some agent.
5. If the first being were newly posited in being, other beings would be non-beings before the positing of the first being, and, in order to exist, they would need to proceed from non-being to being.
6. Therefore, other beings would not proceed from non-being to being without an efficient cause.
7. Therefore, similarly, the first being as posited from eternity did not infer things other than itself immediately in act without the eternal causality of the agent.
10. Hervaeus Natalis’s second argument

Some wanted to say that the causality of the end consists in being that for the love of which something is made, taking ‘being made’ not only for being produced but [also] for being effectively from another […].

And that this (i.e. being that for the love of which something receives its being effectively) is clear. For being ordered toward the end endows what is for the sake of the end with certain amiableness; which is why it is necessary that this amiableness be present in that which is for the sake of the end in relation to the agent that gives being to it on account of the amiability of the end.

Also, because the causality of the final cause consists in being that for the sake of which; but being that for the sake of which is nothing else than being that for the love of which something is made or receives its being effectively from another.

Also, because being for the sake of the end is nothing else than being intended for the sake of the end; but what is for the sake of the end is not intended by itself but rather by the agent.

(Auriol’s summary in Scriptum I.3.1 of Hervaeus, Quodl. II.1; see also Auriol, Scriptum I.3.1)

11. Auriol’s critics. Gerard of Siena’s objection against Auriol

Thirdly, the above view is lacking in that it posits that the causality of the end consists in terminating the abovementioned inclination. Three unacceptable consequences seem to follow from this statement. The first one is that the final cause will have the nature of a terminus in such a way that it will in no way have the nature of the principle; and as a result, it will not be a cause in the proper sense. For the name ‘principle’ is said of all causes, as is clear in Book V of the Metaphysics. The consequence is clear: for principle is the same as first, as is clear in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. [?] But since a terminus, insofar as terminus, is something last, it can in no way have the nature of what is first; and as a result, neither can it have the nature of the principle.

The second unacceptable consequence is that the final cause will have no causality over these things whose end it is, which seems altogether absurd. But the consequence is clear enough: for a terminus, insofar as terminus, has no causality over what is terminated. Otherwise one of the relatives would have causality over the other. (Siena, In Siena II.1.2; see an almost identical argument in Marchia, Scriptum I.2.2)
12. Auriol’s critics. John of Reading’s objection against Auriol

To the problem concerning the final and efficient cause, I respond differently, in the same way as the first view [i.e. Hervaeus Natalis’s view] says: that the final cause is *that for the love of which something is efficiently* [efficienter] *caused*. And from this there follows a second [thesis]: that *whatever has a final cause* [also] *has an efficient cause*. I prove the first [thesis] in the following way: every cause is prior, at least by nature, to its effect. Hence, since the final cause is one of the causes, and is the first cause, it will be prior by nature to that which has being produced by such a cause. But [the final cause] cannot be prior unless as that for the sake of which as loved something is caused. Therefore etc.

It may be said that that toward which something is ordered is prior in some way to what is so ordered both if what is so ordered is efficiently [*effective*] produced and if not; and so for such a priority of the final cause it is not necessary that it be that for the love of which something is made [*efficitur*].

Against this: it is not only the final cause that is prior to the effect; the causality or causation of the final cause is in some way prior to the effect, too. Therefore, I ask: what is the causality of the final cause and its causation? Either it consists in being that for the sake of which something is made – and this is what I argue for. Or it consists in terminating the inclination of something ordered toward such an end, as the other view claims.

But this [i.e. the second opinion] cannot be posited; for the ordination that something has toward an end, and as a result, terminating such an ordination, is posterior, or at least not prior, to that which has this ordination. Therefore, if that were the causation of the final cause, the causation of the final cause would not be prior to the effect, but rather posterior to it. (Reading, *Scriptum* I.2.3)

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