

Quotations in Latin and English

Chrysostom Javellus (1472–1538):

1. Ad motionem metaphoricam sufficit esse potentiale cum apprehensione, ad motionem realem requiritur existentia finis, et si non proximi, saltem præcedentis, verbi gratia. Socrates infirmus desiderat sanitatem, et hanc propter conservationem sui in esse, et hanc propter filios parvulos, licet autem sanitas non sit, ipse tamen est, et filii sunt. Ad argumentum ergo dico ad minorem, quod licet finis proximus non semper sit, aliquis tamen præcedens est, et sufficit, et dato quod finis proximus non sit in actu, est tamen in potentia cum apprehensione, quod est possibilis acquiri, et hoc sufficit. (Javellus, *In omnibus Metaphysicæ libris quæsitæ*, V, q. 5; 79r–v)

[Draft translation:] Potential being with apprehension is sufficient for metaphorical motion. The existence of the end is required for real motion, if not proximate then at least preceding, for example. The sick Socrates desires health, both for his conservation in being and for the small children. Although his health is not, he himself is as well as his children. In response to the argument I therefore say to the minor, that although the proximate end is not always, something preceding is, and this suffices. And it is given that although the proximate end is not in act, it is in potency with apprehension, which is possible to acquire, and this suffices.

2. finis complectitur duo. Primo, id per quod est causa. Et est illud per quod movet agens. Secundo, illud sine quo non moveret agens, et dicitur conditio necessario requisita. Causa finalis habet primum ab esse reali ad extra productibili, vel acquisibili. Puta, sanitas possibilis realiter causari in infirmo, est id quod movet medicum. Ideo enim medetur, ut sanitatem potentialem reducat ad actum [...]. Nam si medicus non apprehenderet sanitatem, ut possibilem causari in Socrate, et postquam erit producta, perficiet Socratem, non moveretur ad medendum (Javellus, *In omnibus Metaphysicæ libris quæsitæ*, V, q. 6; 80r)

The end comprises two. First, that through which it is a cause. And this is that through which the agent moves. Second, that without which the agent would not have moved, and this is called a necessarily required condition. The final cause has the first from the real being

externally producible or acquirable. For instance, possible health really caused in the sick is that which moves the doctor. For he heals in order to reduce potential health to act [...] For if the doctor would not apprehend health as possibly caused in Socrates, and as perfecting Socrates once produced, he would not move to heal.

3. inter causam finalem, et suum effectum sit relatio realis, non sufficit solum esse potentiale ad extra, nec solum esse actu apprehensum: sed esse potentiale ad extra, ut stat sub actuali apprehensione, et dico, quod ut est producibilis, et actualiter apprehensus est sufficiens ad fundandum relationem realem. Ad argumentum, ergo nego illam consequentiam, ergo finis ut est causa debet esse actu ad extra. Hoc inquam non est necesse, sed sufficit quod habeat esse potentiale cum actuali apprehensione. Ex his enim simul iunctis tantam habet actualitatem, quanta sufficit ad relationem realem. (Javellus, *In omnibus Metaphysicæ libris quæsitæ*, V, q. 6; 80v)

[Draft translation:] For there to be a real relation between the final cause and its effect, it neither suffices that it is externally potential only, nor that it is actually apprehended, but rather that it is externally potential as it stands under actual apprehension. And I say, that insofar as it is producible, and actually apprehended, it is sufficient for it to be a foundation of a real relation. As an argument, I therefore deny this consequence, that is, that the end as a cause has to be actual externally. This, I say, is not necessary, but it suffices that it has potential being with actual apprehension. For from these coming together simultaneously alone it has so much actuality as to suffice for a real relation.

4. Non dicit Aristoteles quod habet rationem optimi, sed quod inter causas est optima causa, eo quod dat quodammodo causalitatem aliis causis. Unde dicitur esse causa causarum, stat autem quod habeat optimam causalitatem et tamen non habeat optimum esse, nisi post productionem, aut acquisitionem. (Javellus, *In omnibus Metaphysicæ libris quæsitæ*, V, q. 6; 80v)

Aristotle does not say that it has the best nature ('ratio'), but that it is the best cause among the causes in virtue of the fact that it in some way gives causality to the other causes.

Wherefore it is called the cause of causes, for it stands that it has the best causality but not that it has the best being, unless after the production or acquisition.

Francis Silvestri (1474–1526):

5. Nam appetibile, sive finis, dupliciter comparari potest ad voluntatem: uno modo, respectu illius actus quo vult finem; alio modo, respectu illius actus quo vult ea quae ordinatur ad finem. Dico igitur duo: / Primo est quod, si finis comparetur ad voluntatem respectu illius actus quo vult finem, non movet voluntatem effective proprie, tanquam videlicet forma quae sit principium elicitive volitionis: sed movet tantum formaliter, per modum formae specificantis operationem extra potentiam operantem existentis. / Alterum est quod, si finis comparetur ad voluntatem respectu volitionis eorum quae sunt ad finem, finis movet voluntatem per modum efficientis, tanquam ratio agendi. (Silvestri, *Comm in SCG*, I.44, IV; 131a–b)

For the appetible, or the end, can be related to the will in two ways: in one way, with respect to those acts by which it wills the end; in another way, with respect to those acts by which it wills that which is ordered to the end. I therefore say two things: / First, if the end is related to the will with respect to those actions by which it wills the end, it does not properly move the will effectively, namely as the form that is the elicitive principle of the will. But it moves only formally, by way of a specifying form of the operation that exists outside of the operating faculty. / The other thing to say is that if the end is related to the will with respect to the volitions that are for the end, the end moves the will in an efficient way, as the reason ('ratio') for acting.

6. Sciendum tertio, quod species actus specificati non distinguitur realiter a substantia et natura ipsius actus, sed tantum secundum rationem: non enim entitas calefactionis distinguitur a specie calefactionis, sed una et eadem res est actio ipsa et calefactio. [...] Similiter ergo motus appetitus circa finem non oportet quaerere, quantum ad eius specificationem; causam efficientem aliam ab ipso appetitu, sed appetitus ipse est

causa actus specificati: ratio autem formalis, a qua formaliter habet ipse actus ut sit talis actus et ipse appetitus ut actum sic specificatum producat, est ipsum appetibile existens in appetente intelligibiliter. Sic ergo in volitione finis appetibile movet appetitum quantum ad specificationem actus, quia est ratio et forma unde formaliter habet quod actus eius sit talis: non autem effective concurrat ad ipsum actum per modum elicientes operationem. (Silvestri, *Comm in SCG*, I.44, V; 131b–132a)

It should be known, third, that the species of the specified act is not really distinguished from the substance and nature of this act, but [is] only rationally [distinguished]. For the entity of heating is not really distinguished from the species of heating, but the action itself and the heating are one and the same thing. [...] In a similar way one must not ask regarding the appetital motion around the end, as to its specification. The efficient cause is other than this appetite, but the appetite itself is the cause of the specified act. But the formal ground ('ratio'), from which this act formally comes as it is such-and-such an act and from which this appetite as an act is produced with such a specification, is the same appetibile existing in the one appetizing intelligibly. So, therefore, in the will the appetibile end moves the appetite as to the specification of the act, because it is the ground ('ratio') and form wherefrom it comes formally that its act is such-and-such. It does not concur efficiently, however, to this act by way of eliciting the operation.