

Ends and Means: Acts of Using in Ockham's Moral Psychology

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Use Acts in *Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1

Use acts are volitions

Broadly:

An act of willing some object

Narrowly:

An act of willing some object in
contradistinction to an act of
enjoying

Non-referential volitions:

willing some x
on account of
itself

"Primo modo aliquid assumitur in facultatem voluntatis quando aliquid praesentatum voluntati per intellectum etiamsi sine omni alio praesentaretur assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis. [...] Primus actus est non referens, quando scilicet voluntas elicit aliquem actum circa illud ita quod eundem actum eliceret etiam posito quod nihil aliud sibi ostenderetur, sicut si alicui ostenderetur Deus, appeteret Deum nullo alio sibi ostenso." (*Ordinatio d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 374, ll. 6-16*)

Referential volitions:

willing some x
on account of
willing some y

"Secundo modo assumitur in facultatem voluntatis quando aliquid assumitur in facultatem voluntatis alio praesentato, ita quod si illud aliud non praesentaretur voluntati, vel non assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis, illud non assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis. [...] Secundus actus est referens, quando non eliceretur actus circa illud si nihil aliud sibi ostenderetur vel si nihil aliud assumeretur in facultatem voluntatis, sicut quando aliquis appetit potionem amaram quam non appeteret si non appeteret sanitatem." (*Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 374, ll. 9-20)

A distinction between non- referential volitions:

"Sed quod aliquis actus sit non referens potest esse dupliciter: vel quod obiectum acceptetur tamquam summum sibi possibile praesentari, hoc est tamquam summe diligendum ab ea, vel absolute quod acceptetur et absolute assumatur in facultatem voluntatis, nec ut summum nec ut non summum. Primus actus est actus fruendi, quando aliquid acceptatur tamquam simpliciter summum. Secundus actus nec est proprie frui nec propri uti, sed tertius actus [i.e., a referential volition] est proprissime uti."
(*Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 374-375, ll. 20-7)

A puzzle about use acts:

Is a use act numerically one act without qualification or does it include several numerically distinct acts, [namely] one that is exclusively about the end and one that is exclusively about that which is towards the end?

"Secunda difficultas est de actu utendi proprissime dicto: an sit simpliciter unus actus numero vel includat plures distinctos numero quorum unus sit praecise respectu finis et alias sit praecise respectu illius quod est ad finem." (*Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 376, ll: 15-18)

A possible first solution

T1: A use act breaks down into two numerically and specifically distinct acts

Argument:

1. When something that is a means to an end is loved on account of the end, both the end and the means are loved;
2. But the end and the means cannot be loved by [one and] the same act;
3. Therefore, there are at least two acts.

“Et pro hoc potest argui primo sic: quando illud quod est ad finem diligitur propter finem, et finis et illud quod est ad finem diligitur; sed finis et illud quod est ad finem non possunt diligiri uno actu; igitur sunt ibi plures actus.”
(Ordinatio d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 379, II: 7-11)

An objection: connection problems

"Probatio: quia quando aliquis actus sine alio a quo potest separari non est actus utendi, ille idem coniunctus cum illo non erit actus utendi, quia actus aliis non facit actum eundem numero esse actum utendi qui non erat prius actus utendi, nec e converso. Sed iste actus qui praecise terminatur ad illud quod est ad finem, posset esse sine omni actu respectu finis, quia voluntas libere potest ferri in quocumque obiectum sibi ostensum, nullo alio ablato. Sed hoc posito non erit actus utendi, quia non diligitur propter aliud; nec ergo quando est simul cum actu respectu finis erit actus utendi."
(*Ordinatio*, d. 1, q. 1, OTh I, 383, ll. 6-15)

A causal connection

A volition is a use act only if (i) it is first caused by some other act, namely the end act, and (ii) it is conjoined to the end act.

"[...] alio modo pro actu terminato ad aliquod obiectum, causato ex actu fruendi respectu alicuius; [...] Secundo modo actus iste non est actus utendi nisi quando causatur ex alio actu sibi coniuncto. Et isto modo accipiendo actum utendi idem actus numero potest esse primo actus utendi et postea etiam manens potest non esse actus utendi, quia potest primo causari ab aliquo actu respectu finis vel ab aliquo actu fruendi, et postea destructo illo actu fruendi potest voluntas illum actum numero continuare." (*Ordinatio*, d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 383-384; ll. 24-9)

An example:

"Suppose someone were to first love a medicinal drink without qualification because she loves her health. Her love for the drink will be a use act, since it is caused by the other act [i.e., the love for her health]. If her love of the drink were to continue [to exist] by means of the freedom of her will even if she in fact no longer loved her health, then it would not be a use act [any more]. For in this case, it would neither be **caused** nor **conserved** by the act regarding her health" (my translation, *Ordinatio*, d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 384; ll. 9-14).

A plausible second solution

T₁: A use act breaks down into two numerically and specifically distinct acts

and

T₂: A use act can be numerically one act

Argument for the second solution

1. The will-power relates to an end and the means to an end as the intellect-power relates to principles and conclusions;
2. The intellect-power can (i) know principles and conclusions by distinct acts and (ii) can cognize both by one act;
3. Therefore, the will-power can (i) have distinct acts with respect to the end and the means to the end and (ii) can will both by one act.

"Hoc [i.e., the second solution] potest declari, quia sicut intellectus se habet ad principia et conclusiones, ita voluntas se habet ad finem et ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed intellectus potest scire conclusionem distincto actu ab actu quo cognoscitur principium, et potest unico actu cognoscere utrumque, ergo eodem modo voluntas potest habere distinctos actus respectus finis et illius quod est ad finem, et unum act respectu utriusque." (*Ordinatio d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 381-382, ll. 22-3*)

Analogy to the intellect-power

T₁

"[...] notitia principii est causa notitiae conclusionis; sed causa distinguitur realiter ab effectu suo; igitur potest esse alius actus quo cognositur principium et quo cognoscitur conclusio." (*Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 382, ll. 5-8)

$[p]^{\text{Act}_1}; [q]^{\text{Act}_2}; [\text{therefore}, c]^{\text{Act}_3}$

T₂

"[...] non magis repugnat intellectui intelligere unico actu unum discursum vel unam consequentiam quam unam propositionem; sed unico actu potest intelligere unam propositionem." (*Ordinatio* d. 1, q. 1, OTh. I, 382, ll. 8-11)

$[p ; q ; \text{therefore}, c]^{\text{Act}_1}$

Use acts as complex volitions: the causal process

1. incomplex intellection (cognition of pleasure) >
2. incomplex volition (desiring that pleasure) >
3. incomplex intellection (cognition of *Pride and Prejudice*) >
4. complex intellection (belief: the one shall be obtained by means of the other) >
5. complex volition (desiring *Pride and Prejudice* as a means of obtaining that pleasure) = using *Pride and Prejudice*

Ockham's final word on final causality: *Quodlibet 4*, qq. 1 and 2

A final cause is something that “is loved and desired efficaciously by an agent, so that the effect is brought about because of the thing that is loved” (translation by Freddoso and Kelley, 245)

“[...] definitio causae finalis est esse amatum et desideratum efficaciter ab agente, propter quod amatum fit effectus.” (*Quodlibet 4*, q. 1, OTh. IX, 294, ll. 22-23)

An efficient cause is “to be that which is such that something else follows upon its existence or presence” (translation by Freddoso and Kelley, 245)

“[...] definitio causae efficientis est esse illud ad cuius esse sive praesentiam sequitur aliud.” (*Quodlibet 4*, q. 1, OTh. IX, 294, ll: 23-25)

Complex
volitions?
Ordinatio d. 1,
q. 6

Complex volitions?

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Ockham distinguishes between:

"[1] a willing with respect to an incomplex, and this is properly called love, and [2] a willing with respect to a complex, taken in a broad sense, such as willing to be blessed or willing not to be such and such or some such" (translation modified from Sonja Schierbaum, "Intellections and Volitions: Ockham's Voluntarism Reconsidered," Springer: 2017, 131).

"Quarta distinctio est quod sicut quoddam est velle respectu incomplexi, et hoc proprie vocatur amor, et quoddam est respectu complexi, large accipiendo complexum, sicut velle habere beatitudinem vel velle non esse vel aliquid tale [...]." (*Ordinatio*, d. 1, q. 6, OTh, I, 502, ll. 20-23)